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Abstract
Background: Free trade agreements (FTAs) can affect food environments and non-communicable disease risks
through altering the availability of highly-processed foods. Few studies have quantified such effects. Using a natural
experiment this paper quantifies changes in Peru’s soft-drink market before/after entry into the US-Peru FTA,
compared with Bolivia, a county with no such agreement.
Methods: Difference-in-difference models were used to test for between country differences in the rate of per
capita foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, soft-drink imports, the volumes of various soft-drinks sold, and the
volumes of sugar from soft-drinks before/after FTA ratification (2006) and enforcement (2009).
Results: In Peru average per capita FDI-inflows rose from US$103.11 in the pre-ratification period to US$269.79
post-ratification, with little change in Bolivia. This corresponded with a 122 % increase in Peruvian soft-drink
production. There was a significant between-country difference in FDI-inflows pre-/post-ratification (DID:1.07,
95 % CI:0.19–1.96; p = 0.01). Despite little difference in total per capita soft-drink sales volumes there was a
significant between-country difference in per capita sugar from soft-drinks pre-/post enforcement (DID:-0.99, 95 % CI:
−1.91–0.06; p = 0.03) with stagnated growth in Peru and continued growth in Bolivia. This resulted from stagnated
sugar sweetened carbonates growth and increased bottled water, juice and sports & energy drinks growth in Peru,
with continued carbonates growth in Bolivia. There was a significant between-country difference in per capita
carbonates (DID: −1.44, 95 % CI: −2.52–0.36, p = 0.01) and bottled water (DID:0.63; 95 % CI: −0.01–1.26; p = 0.04)
sales volumes.
Conclusions: The FTA may have resulted in increased FDI-inflows and soft-drink production and also contributed to
the diversification of soft drinks produced and sold in Peru with some positive (stagnated carbonates and increased
bottled water) and some negative (increased juice and sports & energy drinks) implications for nutrition. These changes
were not evident in Bolivia. These results should be interpreted cautiously given the study design limitations.
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Background
This paper aims to inform understanding of the impacts of
trade and investment liberalization events on population-
level nutrition by quantifying the effects of the United
States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (US-Peru FTA)
on Peru’s soft-drink market and consumption, in contrast
to Bolivia, a country with no such agreement.
Since the 1980’s the proliferation of free trade agree-
ments (FTAs) has globalized markets in highly-processed
foods. Because such foods (e.g. biscuits, confectionary,
savoury snacks and sugar sweetened beverages), tend to
be high in glycaemic load, fat and salt and because their
consumption is rapidly increasing in low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs), they are implicated in the ris-
ing burden of diet-related non-communicable diseases
(NCDs) globally [1, 2].
There are several reasons why the globalization of
markets in sugar-sweetened beverages (SSB) in particular
is important to the investigation of trade agreements and
health. There is strong empirical evidence implicating SSB
consumption as a risk factor for obesity, type-2 diabetes
and CVD [3, 4]. Transnational beverage companies
(TBCs) are, in terms of sales and market capitalization,
among the largest and most economically powerful group
of transnational food and beverage companies [5, 6].
The sector is highly concentrated at the global level
with two US firms, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, together con-
trolling 35.7 and 71.7 % (by value) of the soft-drink and
carbonated soft-drink markets respectively in 2014 [7].
Through their considerable market power, including a
combined $7.27 billion global advertising expenditure in
2013 [8], these firms can shape global and local food sys-
tems in ways that alter the availability, affordability and
desirability of soft-drinks and thereby shape population
level consumption patterns [9–12].
Evidence demonstrates that the evolving global trade
regime creates favourable market conditions that allow
TBCs to more easily transfer investments, technologies,
production capacity, raw materials and final products
from high-income to LMICs [10, 13–16]. Recently there
has been concern that the emerging form of regional
FTAs moves the scope beyond reducing tariffs on imports
to increased protections for foreign investors and a deep-
ening reach ‘behind-the-border’ into regulatory controls on
governments domestic policy-making capacities [17, 18].
The Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement be-
tween 12 ‘Pacific-Rim’ nations, is potentially the most
significant trade policy of the 21st century, representing
a population of 792 million consumers and 40 % of glo-
bal gross domestic product [19]. Negotiations for the
TPP were completed in October 2015 and a final draft
text of the full agreement released only in early Novem-
ber 2015. The TPP is likely to have serious implications
for population-level nutrition and health [20]. Recent
qualitative analyses of previously leaked chapters of the
negotiating text revealed provisions on foreign investment
liberalization (including stronger investor protections) and
intellectual property rights that extend beyond those of
existing multilateral agreements. Such provisions have the
potential to facilitate greater TBC market access and pro-
mote the availability and consumption of highly-processed
foods, while simultaneously restricting the capacities of
governments to regulate markets for these foods to pro-
tect public health [18, 21].
However to date there has been little quantitative evi-
dence as to the likely nutritional effects of FTAs such as
the TPP. Stuckler et al. found that per capita soft-drink
consumption was 63.4 % higher in countries with a
United States (US) FTA than in countries with no such
agreement. The same study reported a large increase in
soft-drink consumption in Mexico following the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, which
by 2010 had reached 300 litres per capita per year—the
highest volume globally [10]. Others also observed similar
increases in unprocessed and processed food imports and
foreign direct investment (FDI) by US firms into Mexico
following NAFTA, including soft-drinks [22]. Large-scale
changes in unprocessed and processed food imports and
consumption were also observed in Central American
countries following the US-Central America Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA) in 2004 [23]. Another study found
significant associations between liberalization measures
and diet-related health outcomes including cardiovascular
diseases (CVD) and obesity in Sub-Saharan Africa [24]. In
a previous analysis we found that the removal of restric-
tions on FDI by Vietnam, following its accession to the
WTO in 2007, led to significant growth of that countries
sugar-sweetened carbonated beverages market, in contrast
to the Philippines a matched control country that had
acceded in 1995 [25]. These findings are consistent
with evidence of a positive association between FDI and
the prevalence of diet-related NCDs in middle-income
countries [10].
The motivation for this analysis was to elucidate the
effects of a previously ratified FTA with the aim of better
understanding the potential implications of new FTAs,
including the TPP, for population nutrition.. Addition-
ally, methodologies for quantifying the effects of FTAs
on nutrition are underdeveloped and we set out to de-
termine whether a natural experiment design, commonly
used to assess the effects of policies and other large-
scale interventions, might be appropriate [26]. On these
grounds we adopted a natural experiment design to
quantify the effects of the US-Peru FTA, ratified in 2006
and enforced in 2009, in contrast to Bolivia a suitably-
matched country having no such agreement, on Peru’s
soft drink market. The US-Peru FTA, which is similar to
the preceding NAFTA and CAFTA agreements, resulted
Baker et al. Globalization and Health  (2016) 12:24 Page 2 of 13
in the preferential elimination of tariffs on soft-drink im-
ports (previously 25 %), as well as stronger protections
for US investors, and strengthened intellectual property
rights [27]. Obesity is a pressing public health concern
in Peru and Bolivia where rates of adult obesity are high,
15.7 and 17.9 % respectively [28, 29]. By soft drinks we
refer to the sugar-sweetened/high-sugar categories carbon-
ates, juice and sports & energy drinks, and the unsweet-
ened category bottled water.
In this analysis we test the following three hypotheses;
 Hypothesis One: Reduced barriers to investment
resulted in a significant change in FDI-inflows into
Peru, with no comparative change in Bolivia, and a
corresponding change in soft-drink production in Peru.
 Hypothesis Two: Reduced barriers to trade resulted
in a significant change in soft-drink imports into
Peru, with no comparative change in Bolivia.
 Hypothesis Three: Changes in FDI-inflows, production
and imports resulted in a significant change in
soft-drink sales volumes in Peru, corresponding
with a change in sugar from soft-drinks, with no
comparative respective changes in Bolivia.
Methods
Study design and case selection
A natural experiment study design was adopted [26, 30]
since the intervention (ratification of a US-FTA) is not
amenable to experimental manipulation, and it was pos-
sible to compare an intervention country (one that had
ratified a US-FTA) and a control country (one that had
not) [26]. The control country was matched to the inter-
vention country against economic, demographic and
trade indicators reported in the literature to effect soft-
drink consumption [3, 10], including population and in-
come growth (Table 1). We also wanted to include a TPP
country in the analysis to demonstrate what has previously
happened in the country as a consequence of trade
liberalization, thereby providing a richer understanding of
the context in which the TPP will operate. Against these
criteria Peru was selected as the intervention country and
Bolivia as the control country.
The US-Peru FTA was ratified in 2006 and enforced in
2009. We predicted that due to enhanced US investor
confidence in Peru (a so-called ‘market signal’) following
ratification, trade and investment flows and changes in
soft-drink markets may have begun prior to enforce-
ment. Additionally, the agreement may not have had im-
mediate effects given the potential time-lag between
increased capital investments in plants and machinery
and production outputs resulting from those invest-
ments. To ascertain the effects of timing, therefore, we
used two intervention time points in our statistical tests
corresponding to the ratification year 2006 and the en-
forcement year 2009 respectively. Exogenous historical
variables may have generated some heterogeneity in the
data [30]. To contextualise the analysis we therefore pre-
pared a description of significant trade and investment
liberalization events and market developments in the re-
spective countries, as given in Table 2.
Conceptual framework
The analysis was guided by a recent conceptual frame-
work developed as part of the INFORMAS trade and nu-
trition monitoring module [31]. Specifically, the ‘foreign
direct investment’ and ‘trade in goods’ pathways were
used, as described in Fig. 1. Based on these pathways we
assigned ratification and enforcement of the agreement as
the independent variable, and FDI-inflows, soft-drink im-
port volumes, soft-drink sales volumes and sugar from
soft drinks volumes as the dependent variables.
Variables, measures and data sources
A description of variables, measures and data sources
used in the analysis is given in Table 3. All economic,
FDI, production and trade data were adjusted as per
capita, using total population estimates from the World
Bank World Development Indicators database [32]. Per
capita soft-drink sales volumes were extracted from
Euromonitor International Passport Global Market Infor-
mation database and used as a proxy measure of consump-
tion for the various product categories given in Table 3 [7].
Market growth data were also extracted as % year-on-year
sales growth for the same categories. A ‘Sugar from Soft
Table 1 Change in demographic, economic and trade indicators for Peru and Bolivia, 1993–2013
Peru Bolivia
1993 2003 2013 Δ 1993–2013 % 1993 2003 2013 Δ 1993–2013 %
Population (millions) 23.08 27.07 30.38 31.63 7.3 9.0 10.2 39.73
Urban population (% of total) 70 74 78 11.43 58 63 68 17.24
GDP per capita, PPP 5,329 6,883 11,396 113.85 3,887 4,367 5,934 52.66
FDI intensity (% of GDP) 2.2 2.3 4.6 109.09 2.2 2.4 5.7 159.09
Trade intensity (% of GDP) 29 37 48 65.52 47 52 81 72.34
Footnotes: GDP per capita expressed as purchasing power parity (PPP) in constant 2011 international $ for comparability; Data from World Bank World
Development Indicators; Δ = change
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Drinks’ variable was included as a proxy measure of
sugar consumption from soft-drinks. We have previ-
ously described the method for calculating this using
Euromonitor ingredients data linked to the soft-drink
categories [33]. Euromonitor collects sales data from a
number of sources including trade associations, indus-
try bodies, business press, company financial reports,
company filings and official government statistics. Con-
sumption volume estimates are validated by people
working within the food industry [7].
Statistical analysis
To test the hypotheses we ran a series of difference-in-
difference (DID) models [30], using STATA v13. This uti-
lized the cross-sectional time-series data described earlier
to assess the statistical significance of the difference be-
tween the intervention country (Peru) and control country
(Bolivia) within time-period differences as defined by the
two pre- and post-intervention time points.
For H1 we ran a DID model comparing between-
country changes in FDI-inflows per capita (1). Because
Table 2 Trade and investment liberalization events and market developments in Peru and Bolivia
Both countries have progressed through successive stages of trade liberalization namely protectionism, unilateral liberalization, accession to the
multilateral system (WTO) and more recently bilateral and regional free trade agreements.
Peru
Unilateral liberalization: Prior to the 1990s high levels of protectionism existed with high tariffs and import bans, with a 66 % tariff average in 1989,
and strict controls on foreign investment. Unilateral liberalization began in 1990 through extensive economic reforms. This included tariff reductions
(maintaining a 25 % tariff on soft-drinks), the elimination of most import prohibitions, strengthened customs procedures, the privatization of state-owned
food enterprises, and the establishment of independent institutions to regulate market competition, intellectual property rights, and foreign investment. In
1993 foreign capital flows and currency exchanges were liberalized. By 1998 the average tariff rate was 13.5 % with no import prohibitions in place.
Multilateral liberalization: Already a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system, on January 1st 1995 Peru acceded to
the WTO. Under Peru’s General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS) commitments, sectors relevant to processed foods including advertising
services, wholesale trade services of beverages, and retailing services of beverages were fully liberalized with the exception of commercial
advertising material produced outside of Peru.
Regional and bilateral liberalization: Since 2004 Peru has entered into multiple PTAs including intra-regional (e.g. MERCOSUR), extra-regional (e.g.
European Union) and bilateral (e.g. US) agreements. The US-Peru FTA was the second of such agreements (the first being MERCOSUR), but is likely
to have had the most significant implications for Peru’s soft-drink market given that the two largest transnational soft-drink companies (Coca-Cola
Company and Pepsico) are US firms. It is also similar to CAFTA and NAFTA (i.e. containing similar provisions) and these agreements had demonstrated
impacts on processed food consumption in previous analyses [27, 40, 23]. The US-Peru FTA eliminated a 25 % tariff on soft-drinks for US firms, while the
average MFN tariff rate (i.e. for other WTO trade partners) was 6 % in 2013.
General market description and developments: Prior to 1999 the US-firm Coca-Cola Company (CCC) and the Peruvian-firm Corp JR Lindley were the
two major competitors in the Peruvian soft-drink market. The two leading brands were Coca-Cola and Inca Kola. Today the soft-drink market is
dominated by two firms. The first was formed in 1999 through a US$200 million merger between the CCC and Corp JR Lindley (CCC-CRL), and
had a total market share of 49.8 % in 2013. The second, the Peruvian firm Aje Group, had a market share of 29.7 % the same year. A third Pepsi-Cola
Panamericana Peru SRL, a subsidiary of the US-firm Pepsico, had a market share of 9.2 %. CCC-CRL has made a number of significant investments in
domestic production and bottling facilities, including acquisition of the bottler Embotelladora Latinonamericana in 2004, and further investments in
‘mega’ production plants and distribution facilities. In 2014, the CCC announced a US$1 billion, 5-year, investment in its Peruvian operations. Prior to
2006 the Peruvian soft-drink market was undiversified with firms competing for market share of the carbonates market. Since then, both CCC-CRL and
Aje group have diversified their product mix, with significant increases in sales of bottled water, juice, and sports & energy drinks.
Bolivia
Unilateral liberalization: Following a long period of economic instability, in 1985 a newly-elected Estenssoro Government implemented its New
Economic Policy that transformed Bolivia from a relatively inward-orientated state-capitalist economy to a more liberalized and privatised one. This
included the elimination of quantitative restrictions on imports and the adoption of a uniform 10 % tariff rate. In 1993 under the ‘capitalization’
agenda of the Lozada Government, foreign investment restrictions were relaxed and many state-owned enterprises underwent partial privatization.
Multilateral liberalization: As a member of the GATT system in September 1995 Bolivia acceded to the WTO. Subsequently in December 1996
Bolivian legislation was implemented to establish free importation with no prior licensing, import quotas or other non-tariff measures. Bolivia’s
average applied MFN tariff rate fell from 9.7 % in 1999 to 8.2 % in 2005, with few non-tariff barriers. Under the GATS agreement Bolivia made
commitments in five of the 12 sectors covered, although sectors most relevant to processed foods were excluded.
Regional and bilateral liberalization: Bolivia is a member of the Andean Community (a custom’s union with Colombia, Ecuador and Peru). It has
entered into preferential trade agreements with Mexico and the MERCOSUR group of countries. As a member of the Bolivarian Alternative for the
Americas (ALBA) Bolivia aligns politically with other socialist governments in the region (Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuala). This group partly aims to
create alternative regional trade initiatives. In 2008, Bolivia withdrew from trade talks with the European Union and later from talks with the United
States and Canada.
General market description and developments: Through franchising arrangements the US-firm Coca-Cola Company (CCC) has dominated Bolivia’s soft
drink market, with a commercial presence since 1943. In 1995 the franchise Vascal and various bottling operators were acquired by Embotelladoras
Bolivianas Unidas SA (EMBOL), a CCC subsidiary, using capital provided by Coca-Cola Embonor (Chile). In 1997, Coca-Cola Embonor acquired an
additional 18.7 % of EMBOL to control 99.9 % of the subsidiary in Bolivia. EMBOL owns seven factories with an annual production capacity of 155
million unit cases (approx. 880 million litres) for its 12 brands. Through its distribution network the company supplies 75,000 retailers. This infrastructure
makes EMBOL, and thus the CCC, the largest manufacturer and distributor of soft drinks in the country with an overall soft drinks market share of 58.3 %
in 2013. Cerveceria Boliviana Nacional is the national franchise manufacturer and distributor of Pepsi products, and the second leading market player
with a market share of 17.2 % in 2013.
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Fig. 1 The ‘foreign direct investment’ and ‘trade in goods’ conceptual pathways used to structure the data analysis. Footnotes: Δ = change;
Adapted from [27]
Table 3 Description of variables and measures included in the analysis, with data sources
Variable Measure Years Definition Source
Per capita gross
domestic product
Purchasing power parity,
constant 2011 international $;
% year-on-year growth
1990–2013 Gross domestic product converted to international dollars
using purchasing power parity rate for comparability
[32]
Per capita foreign
direct investment
in-flows
US$ millions, fixed 2013 prices
and exchange rates; % year-on-
year growth
1990–2013 Value of inward investments involving long-term relationships
and reflecting lasting interests in and control by resident
(parent) entities in one economy of (affiliate) enterprises
resident in a different economy
[39]
Per capita soft-drink
production
US$ millions, fixed 2013 prices
and exchange rates
2000–2013 Value of manufactured non-alcoholic beverages, except
non-alcoholic beer and wine, and of the production of
natural mineral waters
[7]
Per capita soft-drink
imports
Litres; % year-on-year growth 1999–2012 Import volume of mineral waters and aerated waters containing
added sugar or other sweetening matter or flavoured
[41]
Per capita soft-drink
sales
Sales in litres; % year-on-year
growth
1999–2013 Sales volume of the aggregation of all beverage categories [7]
Per capita carbonates
sales
Sales in litres; % year-on-year
growth
1999–2013 Sales volume of cola and non-cola carbonates, whether regular
or low calorie, containing dissolved carbon dioxide, regular &
low calorie
[7]
Per capita bottled
water sales
Sales in litres; % year-on-year
growth
1999–2013 Sales volume of still bottled water, carbonated bottled water,
flavoured bottled water and functional bottled water
[7]
Per capita juice sales Sales in litres; % year-on-year
growth
1999–2013 Sales volume of 100 % juice, nectars (25–99 % juice content),
juice drinks (up to 24 % juice content), fruit-flavoured drinks,
and cereal/pulse-based drinks
[7]
Per capita sports &
energy drinks sales
Sales in litres; % year-on-year
growth
1999–2013 Sales volume of sports and energy drinks [7]
Per capita sugar from
soft-drink volume
Volume in kilograms; % year-
on-year growth
2000–2013 Aggregated volume of sucrose, glucose, fructose (including
high fructose corn syrup) used in the manufacture of soft-drinks
[7]
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soft-drink production data was unavailable for Bolivia
we were unable to run a DID model comparing changes
in production and instead provide the descriptive statis-
tic for Peru only. For H2 we ran a DID model comparing
between-country changes in the rate of beverage imports
from all trading partners. For H3 we ran a DID model
comparing between-country changes in the rate of soft-
drink sales volumes (3a) and sugar from soft-drinks vol-
umes respectively (3b). In addition to the DID models,
time-series line graphs were included to assist in visual-
izing time trends. Model specifications are given below,
where T1 represents estimates in the pre-intervention
period; T2 represents estimates in the post-intervention
period; FDI represents foreign direct investment in-flows
per capita; IMP represents rate of soft-drink import vol-
umes per capita; SSV represents rate of soft drink sales
volumes per capita; and SUG represents per rate of
sugar from soft drinks volume per capita, respectively:
1. ΔΔFDI = (ΔFDIPeru[FDIT2–FDIT1] –
ΔFDIBolivia[FDIT2–FDIT1])
2. ΔΔIMP = (ΔIMPPeru[IMPT2–IMPT1] –
ΔIMPBolivia[IMPT2–IMPT1])
3a.ΔΔSSV = (ΔSSVPeru[SSVT2 − SSVT1] –
ΔSSVBolivia[SSVT2–SSVT1])
3b.ΔΔSUG = (ΔSUGPeru[SUGT2 − SUGT1] –
ΔSUGBolivia[SUGT2–SUGT1])
We also included income (measured as GDP per
capita) as a co-variate, as this was identified as strongly
associated with soft-drink consumption in previous ana-
lyses [3, 10]. Population growth was implicitly controlled
for by converting all data to per capita. The DID model
is also prone to error arising from auto-correlation of
the time-series data and from heterogeneity in the
dependent variable arising from the effects of exogenous
variables. To minimise this we controlled for auto-
correlation using time in years as a covariate. Loge trans-
formations were performed on heteroskedastic variables
(determined by comparative distribution plots and tests
for heteroskedascity). Robust standard errors were calcu-
lated for all model outputs, from which we calculated
±95 % confidence intervals.
Results
Comparing changes in FDI-inflows and soft-drink
production
The first hypothesis was that reduced barriers to invest-
ment would result in a significant change in FDI-inflows
into Peru following the FTA and a corresponding change
in soft-drink production. Figure 2 demonstrates trends
in FDI-inflows per capita in Peru and Bolivia. In Peru
average per capita FDI-inflows rose from US$103.11
(95 % CI: 67.24–139.98) in the pre-ratification period to
US$269.79 (95 % CI: 225.00–314.58) in the post-
ratification period. In Bolivia average FDI-inflows per
capita declined 11.45 % from US$93.39 (CI: 50.23–
136.55) and US$82.69 (95 % CI: 67.75–97.63) respect-
ively. The DID model, with an intervention time-point
of 2006, revealed a significant between-country differ-
ence in loge FDI-inflows per capita (1.07, 95 % CI: 0.19–
1.96; p = 0.013). This was robust to adjustments for GDP
and underlying time-trends (Table 4). The observed
change in FDI-inflows corresponded to a 122 % increase
Fig. 2 Trends in per capita FDI-inflows into Peru and Bolivia, and per capita soft-drink production in Peru, before and after ratification (2006) and
enforcement (2009) of the US-Peru FTA. Footnotes: FDI in-flow data in US$ (fixed 2013 exchange rates and prices) from [36, 39]; soft-drink production
data in US$ (fixed 2013 exchange rates and prices) from [19]
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in soft-drink production in Peru from US$24.60 per
capita in 2005 to US$54.60 per capita in 2014 (Fig. 2).
Comparing changes in soft-drink imports
The second hypothesis was that reduced barriers to
trade would result in a significant change in soft-drink
imports into Peru. Figure 3 demonstrates trends in per
capita soft-drink imports. In Peru average per capita
total soft-drink imports increased from 0.42 L (95 % CI:
0.21–0.63) in the pre-ratification period to 0.54 L (95 %
CI: 0.35–0.73) post-ratification, although between 2006
and 2009 imports declined. The same figures for Bolivia
were 0.12 L (95 % CI: 0.00–0.24) and 0.73 L (95 % CI:
0.46–1.00) respectively. The DID model, with an inter-
vention time-point of 2006, revealed a non-significant
between-country difference in the loge rate of total soft-
drink imports (−0.65, 95 % CI: −1.69–0.37; p = 0.19)
(Table 5). When taken together with the findings in the
previous section, these results suggest that increased
FDI and soft-drink production in Peru resulted in a re-
duction in imports into that country following ratifica-
tion, whereas in Bolivia imports continued to grow
steadily. Figure 3 also demonstrates increased imports of
soft drinks into Bolivia—a small amount of which were
from Peru, rising from <0.1 L per capita in 2006 to
0.058 L in 2012.
Comparing changes in soft-drink sales volumes and sugar
from soft drinks volumes
The third hypothesis was that changes in FDI-inflows,
production and imports would result in a significant
change in soft-drink sales volumes in Peru and that this
would be synonymous with a change in sugar from soft-
drinks volumes. Figure 4 demonstrates changes in the
respective countries’ soft-drink sales volumes and
changes in sugar from soft-drinks volumes. There was
little between-country difference in soft-drink sales vol-
umes per capita. The DID model revealed no significant
between-country difference in the loge rate of change in
soft-drink sales volumes per capita (Table 6). Although
sugar from soft-drinks volume per capita in Peru in-
creased from 4.64Kg (95 % CI: 4.33–4.95) in the pre-
ratification period to 6.45Kg (95 % CI: 6.27–6.64) post-
ratification, sales volumes stagnated from 2009 onwards.
In Bolivia sugar from soft-drinks volume per capita con-
tinued to increase from 4.51Kg (95 % CI: 4.37–4.65) to
7.38Kg (95 % CI: 6.50–8.26) respectively. The DID
model, with an intervention time-point of 2006, revealed
Table 4 Between-country difference-in-difference estimates for rate of change in loge FDI in-flows per capita before and after ratifi-
cation (2006) and before and after enforcement (2009) of the US-Peru FTA
Year Estimate Unadjusted Adjusted for GDP Adjusted for GDP & time trends N
2006 Diff-in-diff 1.07** (0.43) 1.03** (0.47) 1.03** (0.50) 28
R2 0.63 (p = 0.013) 0.64 (p = 0.028) 0.65 (p = 0.041)
2009 Diff-in-diff 0.68* (0.37) 0.67* (0.40) 0.68 (0.43) 28
R2 0.53 (p = 0.064) 0.56 (p = 0.091) 0.60
Notes: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; robust standard-errors in parentheses
Fig. 3 Total soft-drink imports (from all trading partners), before and after ratification (2006) and enforcement (2009) of the US-Peru FTA. Footnotes:
Data from [37]
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a significant between-country difference in the loge rate
of change in sugar from soft-drinks volume per capita
(−0.99, 95 % CI: −1.92–0.06, p = 0.028) robust to adjust-
ment for GDP and underlying time trends (Table 6). The
DID model with an intervention time point of 2009 was
also significant (−1.08, 95 % CI: −2.06–0.1, p = 0.025)
and robust to adjustments for GDP and underlying time
trends.
Explaining divergences in sugar from soft-drinks volumes
We further hypothesised that the observed divergences
in sugar from soft-drinks volumes may reflect changes
in the types of soft-drinks being manufactured and sold
in Peru. Figure 5 demonstrates changes in sales volumes
per capita for the various soft-drink categories. The ob-
served change in the Peruvian market was largely due to
increases in bottled water, juice and sports & energy
drinks sales volumes, whereas from 2010 onwards car-
bonates sales volume stagnated. This suggests that stag-
nated sugar from soft drinks volumes in Peru was
largely due to a change in the types of soft drinks pro-
duced and sold. The change in the Bolivian soft-drink
market was almost exclusively due to an increase in car-
bonated soft-drinks sales volumes which exceeded per
capita volumes in Peru from 2008 onwards. Per capita
sales volumes for each category are also given in
Fig. 6a–d, demonstrating clear divergences between the
two country markets. Between-country DID models
were statistically significant with an intervention time-
point of 2006 for the loge rate of change in carbonated
soft-drinks (−1.44, 95 % CI: −2.52–0.36, p = 0.006), ro-
bust to adjustments for GDP and underlying time trends.
Between-country DID models were statistically significant
with an intervention time-point of 2009 for the loge rate
of change in bottled water (0.63, 95 % CI: −0.01–1.26, p =
0.043), robust to adjustments for GDP and underlying
time trends (Table 7).
Discussion
This analysis revealed two main findings. First, relative
to Bolivia, foreign direct investment (FDI) in-flows into
Peru increased significantly following ratification and en-
forcement of the US-Peru FTA. This corresponded with
a non-significant decline in soft drinks imports into
Peru, with no change observed in Bolivia. The increased
FDI-inflows into Peru corresponded with a sustained in-
crease in soft-drink production. This suggests that the
FTA may have shaped Peru’s soft-drink market by way
of encouraging FDI by US transnational soft-drink cor-
porations and that resulting increased production led to
less reliance on imports. This finding supports the view
that although cross-border trade of goods remains im-
portant, FDI is now a key strategy used by transnational
beverage corporations (TBCs) to achieve market share
in developing countries. In this case, such FDI likely
Table 5 Between-country difference-in-difference estimates for
loge rate of change in soft-drink imports per capita before and after
ratification (2006) and enforcement (2009) of the US-Peru FTA
Year Estimate Unadjusted Adjusted
for GDP
Adjusted for GDP
& time trends
N
2006 Diff-in-diff −0.65 (0.5) −0.62 (0.51) −0.66 (0.50) 28
R2 0.07 0.09 0.26
2009 Diff-in-diff −0.13 (0.41) −0.13 (0.42) −0.13 (0.46) 28
R2 0.13 0.04 0.08
Notes: robust standard-errors in parentheses
Fig. 4 Trends in soft-drink sales volumes per capita and kilograms of sugar from soft-drinks volumes per capita in Peru and Bolivia, before and
after ratification (2006) and enforcement (2009) of the US-Peru FTA. Footnotes: Data from [19]
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went into establishing manufacturing plants and other
commercial operations of US TBCs [14, 34–36]. These
results are consistent with the findings of other analyses
demonstrating significant changes in FDI by transnational
food and beverage corporations in Mexico following
NAFTA, and in Central American countries following
CAFTA, both FTAs with the United States [22, 27]. Inter-
estingly we also observed an increase, albeit small, in soft
drink imports into Bolivia from Peru following enforce-
ment, suggesting the US-Peru FTA may have had regional
effects on soft drink sales.
The second finding supports the general hypothesis
that trade agreements can influence the volumes and
types of foods and beverages available for purchase and
sold, and nutrients consumed. Although the increased
total per capita soft-drink sales volume observed in Peru
was not in excess of that observed in Bolivia, there was a
noticeable change in the types of soft-drinks sold. This
was characterised by stagnated growth in carbonated
soft drinks, which are predominantly sugar-sweetened
and expanded growth in the bottled water, juice and
sports & energy drinks categories, with the latter two
categories also known to be high in added sugar. In par-
allel we observed stagnated growth in sugar from soft-
drinks volume in Peru, whereas in Bolivia this continued
to increase alongside carbonated soft drinks sales vol-
ume. This suggests that the increase in FDI in-flows and
production was associated with a change in the types of
beverages manufactured and sold in Peru. Although the
observed increase in bottled water sales in Peru may
have had positive effects for public health if consumed
as a substitute for sugar-sweetened beverages, this may
have been off-set partly by increased sales of the high
sugar categories juice and sports & energy drinks. How-
ever, it is important to note that the study design makes it
difficult to draw inferences and the results may simply re-
flect changes in the strategic decisions made by soft-drink
manufacturers in response to consumer demand for
Table 6 Between country difference-in-difference estimates for loge rate of change in soft-drink sales volumes per capita and Log
sugar from soft-drinks volumes per capita before and after ratification (2006) and enforcement (2009) of the US-Peru FTA
Category Year Estimate Unadjusted Adjusted for GDP Adjusted for GDP & time trends N
Soft drinks 2006 Diff-in-diff −0.41 (0.36) −0.41 (0.38) −0.35 (0.32) 30
R2 0.06 0.06 0.44
2009 Diff-in-diff −0.47 (0.32) −0.44 (0.33) −0.45 (0.37) 30
R2 0.19 0.21 0.24
Sugar from soft-drinks 2006 Diff-in-diff −0.99* (0.45) −0.99* (0.50) −0.98* (0.50) 30
R2 0.19 (p = 0.28) 0.19 (p = 0.047) 0.29 (p = 0.049)
2009 Diff-in-diff −1.08* (0.48) −1.07* (0.52) −1.10* (0.51) 30
R2 0.37 (p = 0.025) 0.37 (0.039) 0.47 (0.03)
Notes: *p < 0.05; standard-errors in parentheses
Fig. 5 Soft-drink category sales volumes per capita in Peru and Bolivia before and after ratification (2006) and enforcement (2009) of the US-Peru
FTA. Footnotes: Data from [19]
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different products rather than changes in FDI in-flows
and production resulting from the FTA. Others have also
acknowledged the difficulty of separating the effects of
trade liberalization from other social and economic influ-
ences on food markets and consumer behaviour [22].
There are several other limitations of this analysis that
are important to consider. It is not feasible to conduct
an experimental intervention to assess the effects of
trade and investment policy on food systems and dietary
outcomes [25]. Natural experiment designs can produce
empirical evidence in situations where an experimental
manipulation of the intervention is unfeasible, but when
it is important to understand the health impacts of pol-
icies and other large-scale phenomena [26, 30]. We used
this design in a previous analysis that found a significant
increase in sugar-sweetened carbonated soft drink sales
volumes in Vietnam following that country’s removal of
FDI restrictions subsequent to its accession to the WTO
in 2007, in contrast to a control country the Philippines
which acceded in 1995 [25]. However, in contrast to
Peru, which had stages of unilateral and multi-lateral
liberalization prior to the US-Peru FTA, Vietnam was a
highly protected market prior to its WTO accession. Thus
the US-Peru FTA was not a clear intervention point but
additive to prior liberalization events. We justified this by
inferring from previous analyses (described in the back-
ground section) that an FTA with the US, home to the
world’s two largest transnational beverage companies,
would likely produce significant changes in Peru’s soft drink
market beyond the effects of prior liberalization events.
Another challenge in using the natural experiment de-
sign in this analysis was to determine where to introduce
the intervention time-point. For example, although the
US-Peru FTA was ratified in 2006 and enforced in 2009,
changes in soft-drink markets may have occurred earlier
when, for example, the Office of the US Trade Representa-
tive notified US Congress of the Government’s intention to
initiate negotiations with Peru in November 2003, with ne-
gotiations beginning in May 2004. Because this may have
enhanced US investor confidence in Peru (a so-called ‘mar-
ket signal’) trade and investment flows may have begun as
early as 2004. The staggered timing of the agreement and
Fig. 6 a–d Soft drink category sales volumes per capita in Peru and Bolivia for the respective categories before and after ratification (2006) and
enforcement (2009) of the US-Peru FTA. a) carbonates; b) juice; c) bottled water; d) sports & energy drinks. Footnotes: Data from [19]
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associated processes (e.g. notification of intent to con-
gress→ negotiation→ ratification→ enforcement) made it
difficult to define a single intervention time-point.
For these reasons we included two time-points in our
models: 2006 as the ratification year and 2009 as the
enforcement year.
Future analyses may be strengthened by using a num-
ber of falsification tests, through the use of a synthetic
control group (e.g. a composite of multiple countries) ra-
ther than a single control country, and by controlling for
other variables that can shape a given country’s in-ward
investment and trade flows. In addition to the variables
controlled for in this analysis, these can include, for ex-
ample, proximity to major markets, economic and polit-
ical stability, wage-rates, corporate tax structures and
other financial (dis)incentives [25, 37]. To the best of
our knowledge there were no discernible changes in
these factors in either Peru or Bolivia during the selected
time-period. To overcome the limitations of the small-N
natural experiment design adopted in this analysis, fu-
ture analyses could adopt medium- to large-N statistical
designs that test associations between the ‘depth’ of pro-
visions in trade agreements among all trade partners,
with food systems and nutrition measures in all coun-
tries for which comparable data is available.
Additional data limitations make clear inferences from
this analysis difficult. It was not possible to obtain
industry-specific FDI data and the reported trends may
therefore reflect FDI in other industries. However, the ob-
served corresponding increase in soft-drink production in
Peru suggests that a significant proportion of new FDI-
inflows was in the soft-drink industry [38]. Further, we did
not capture changes in sales volumes containing non-
caloric soft drinks, although this category is likely to be
consumed in significant volumes. Nonetheless, the ‘sugar
from soft drinks’ variable allowed us to quantify trends in
sugar from sugar-sweetened beverages irrespective of
trends in non-caloric soft drinks. Finally, per capita sales
volume is a proxy measure of consumption and does not
capture other sources of soft drinks including those from
informal (non-market) sources, nor does it account for
wastage (i.e. the proportion of sales not consumed).
Conclusions
Using the example of Peru and Bolivia, this analysis
demonstrates two ways in which FTAs can influence the
domestic food environment, thereby affecting the nutri-
tional makeup of the local food supply, with implications
for diet-related health. The analysis highlights the im-
portant FDI pathway, which is now the primary strategy
used by transnational food and beverage corporations to
achieve market share in developing country markets and
a key mechanism by which FTAs affect food availability
and consumption. The analysis also demonstrates that
FTAs can influence the diversity and volumes of bever-
ages produced and available for consumption. In the
case of Peru this appears to have had both positive and
negative implications for nutrition, with stagnated sugar-
sweetened carbonated beverages sales and an increase in
non-caloric bottled water, but increases in the high-
Table 7 Between country difference-in-difference estimates for loge rate of change in soft drink category sales volumes per capita
before and after ratification (2006) and enforcement (2009) of the US-Peru FTA
Year Estimate Unadjusted Adjusted for GDP Adjusted for GDP & time trends N
Carbonates 2006 Diff-in-diff −1.44*** (0.53) −1.46*** (0.56) −1.39*** (0.48) 30
R2 0.30 (p = 0.006) 0.30 (p = 0.009) 0.57 (p = 0.004)
2009 Diff-in-diff −1.36*** (0.50) −1.35*** (0.51) −1.35** (0.58) 30
R2 0.37 (p = 0.006) 0.38 (p = 0.009) 0.38 (p = 0.019
Bottled water 2006 Diff-in-diff 0.62* (0.32) 0.59* (0.33) 0.62* (0.32) 30
R2 0.68 (p = 0.051) 0.69 (p = 0.07) 0.74 (p = 0.051)
2009 Diff-in-diff 0.63** (0.31) 0.59* (0.34) 0.63** (0.26) 30
R2 0.45 (p = 0.043) 0.47 (p = 0.085) 0.77 (p = 0.016)
Juice 2006 Diff-in-diff 0.09 (0.81) 0.48 (0.69) 0.53 (0.66) 30
R2 0.04 0.47 0.55
2009 Diff-in-diff −0.47 (0.60) −0.02 (0.52) −0.21 (0.55) 30
R2 0.04 0.53 0.55
Sports & energy drinks 2006 Diff-in-diff 0.12 (0.86) 0.27 (0.73) 0.26 (0.75) 30
R2 0.11 0.34 0.37
2009 Diff-in-diff −0.90 (0.65) −0.63 (0.58) −0.67 (0.63) 30
R2 0.13 0.35 0.38
Notes: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01, standard-errors in parentheses
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sugar categories juice and sports & energy drinks. How-
ever, limitations of the qausi-natural experiment design
adopted in this analysis makes inferences difficult and
these conclusions should be interpreted with caution.
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